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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to document and explain the allocation of takeover purchase 
price to identifiable intangible assets (IIAs), purchased goodwill, and/or target net 
tangible assets in an accounting environment unconstrained with respect to IIA 
accounting policy choice. Using a sample of Australian acquisitions during the 
unconstrained accounting environment from 1988 to 2004, we find the percentage 
allocation of purchase price to IIAs averaged 19.09%. The percentage allocation to IIAs 
is significantly positively related to return on assets and insignificantly related to 
leverage, contrary to opportunism. Efficiency suggests an explanation: profitable firms 
acquire and capitalise a higher percentage of IIAs in acquisitions. The target's 
investment opportunity set is significantly positively related to the percentage allocation 
to IIAs, consistent with information-signalling.  The paper contributes to the accounting 
policy choice literature by showing how Australian firms make the one-off accounting 
policy choice in regards allocation of takeover purchase price (which is often a 
substantial dollar amount to) in an environment where accounting for IIAs was 
unconstrained.  
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information signalling, opportunism 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Australia, the former accounting standard AASB1015: Acquisitions of Assets, 
which was in force throughout this study's sample period (1988–2004), stipulated 
that the accounting treatment of all acquired assets required that all identifiable 
assets be recorded at their cost and, when necessary, be adjusted to fair values 
when these materially departed from their cost. When the acquisition price 
exceeded the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired, the resulting 
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balance was deemed to be purchased goodwill that had to be accounted for in 
accordance with the former AASB1013: Accounting for Goodwill (1987) (James, 
2010)1. From 1988 to 2004, under AASB1013, purchased goodwill was subject to 
strict and mandatory amortisation on the income statement over the period during 
which the benefits were expected to arise, which in no case could exceed 20 
years. During this time period, there was no equivalent accounting standard for 
identifiable intangible assets (IIAs) (James, 2010; Wyatt, 2005).2 Because there 
are significant practical difficulties in measuring certain IIAs and in separating 
IIAs from goodwill, managers of acquisitions used the relative freedom available 
to them under the accounting regulation AASB1013 to allocate purchase prices 
toward IIAs and away from purchased goodwill (James, 2010; Whittred et al., 
2000; Wines & Ferguson, 1993; Wines et al., 2007). The phrase "away from 
purchased goodwill" in this context reflects the fact that purchased goodwill is 
defined by accounting standards as the mathematical difference of a purchase 
price (at fair value) minus the fair value of the net assets acquired. Therefore, a 
greater dollar allocation to IIAs means a lesser dollar allocation to purchased 
goodwill, assuming that the dollar allocation to the target net tangible assets 
remains unchanged. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which the allocation of a 
purchase price is applied towards IIAs and thus away from purchased goodwill 
during the lifetime of AASB1013 in Australia (1988–2004). We also aim to 
explain the once-off accounting policy choices made during acquisitions by 
examining key variables obtained from costly contracting research including 
acquirers' prior performances; acquirers' leverages; and acquirers' and targets' 
investment opportunity sets (IOS). More specifically, we empirically discriminate 
between two competing perspectives on differences in the percentages of 
purchase prices allocated to IIAs: the information-signalling and opportunism 
perspectives of positive accounting theory.  Knowledge concerning this once-off 
accounting policy choice is important because the sums of money involved in 
takeovers are very large and user groups, especially shareholders and creditors, 
will be interested to know to what extent opportunism or information signalling 
predominates in this choice. If large values of IIAs are kept on the balance sheet 
unamortised when there has been a decline in their value, then shareholders and 
creditors will be provided with a picture of the company's financial position that 
is overly optimistic. They may then invest new funds and/or delay removing 
existing funds when these are not the decisions they would have made if they had 
known the underlying reality of the company's financial position. Our findings 
have important implications for accounting standard setting bodies who continue 
to be put off guard by the strength and vigour of the arguments concerning 
goodwill/intangibles accounting policy choices coming from both sides of the 
debate. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) first 
released in September 1999 Exposure Draft #201, which favoured the treatment 
Allocation Takeover Purchase Price 
3 
for purchased goodwill in the U.K. that involved systematic amortisation. 
Because of the corporate and congressional backlash (Ramanna, 2008), the FASB 
then reversed its position so that the final standards SFAS Nos. 141 and 142 
remove the amortisation requirement in favour of a goodwill impairment test 
(James, 2010). Ramanna (2008) has documented that many of the firms that 
opposed the banning of pooling accounting in the 1999 Exposure Draft became 
supporters of the impairment test at a later stage of the lobbying process when it 
had become clear that pooling would not be revived. We consider a time period 
in Australia during which purchased goodwill accounting was highly regulated 
but IIAs accounting was unregulated (James, 2010). This allows us to determine 
what types of choices were made in this particular environment. Both Holthausen 
and Watts (2001) and Ramanna (2008) have argued that the change to a fair-
value accounting can increase opportunism when the fair values are unverifiable 
with respect to the active market trading prices. With respect to assets for which 
there are no actively traded markets or reliable market prices, the change to fair-
value accounting is then essentially a move towards an unregulated accounting 
environment. As Ramanna (2008) explains for the U.S. context, some pro-poolers 
were pooling abusers and their will to avoid amortisation seems to have held 
significant clout in the FASB's due process. Significantly, the unconstrained 
nature of IIAs reporting during our sample period allows us to observe the 
accounting choices that were made freely by firms in the absence of external 
restrictions upon this area of their activities. 
 
Based on a sample of 52 acquisitions of Australian listed targets by 
Australian listed acquirers over the period from 1988 to 2004, we have found that 
the average percentage of the takeover purchase price allocated to IIAs was 
19.09% (21.70% for the 1988–2000 sub-period). There was a significant drop (of 
about five percentage points annually) in the percentage of a takeover purchase 
that was allocated to IIAs over time, due in part to the opposition voiced by the 
IASB's David Tweedie and other leading Australian accounting authorities in the 
late-1990s and early 2000s with respect to Australia's then allegedly lax 
unregulated accounting environment for IIAs (James, 2010, p. 5, fn. 9).3 The 
decline after 2000 coincides with the increased opposition being voiced around 
and after this time concerning firms allocating too much of a purchase price to 
IIAs to avoid goodwill amortisation. 
 
Our results show that the percentage of allocation to IIAs is significantly 
positively related to the rate of return on assets (hereafter ROA), a traditional 
contracting variable, which is contrary to opportunism. The efficiency 
perspective of positive accounting theory provides an explanation: profitable 
firms acquire and capitalise a higher percentage of IIAs in acquisitions. These 
IIAs are a major reason for the continued profitability of such firms. Leverage is 
insignificant, which is also contrary to the opportunism argument. There is a 
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significant positive association between the target's investment opportunity set 
and the percentage of allocation to IIAs, which is consistent with the information-
signalling perspective of positive accounting theory. Furthermore, the use of a 
high quality auditor is positively associated with the percentage of allocation to 
IIAs, which is consistent with the argument that high quality auditors are hired 
for their knowledge base of acquisition accounting policy choices that both 
produce favourable financial statement outcomes and are theoretically defensible. 
This finding is consistent with Watts and Zimmerman's (1979) 'market for 
excuses' theory. We have subjected our findings to a battery of tests and they are 
robust to several variable specifications.  
 
In a supplementary analysis, we found that the percentage of a purchase 
price allocated to purchased goodwill is significantly negatively correlated with 
the acquirer's subsequent three-year abnormal returns, suggesting an initial 
overpayment for purchased goodwill in some cases. The percentage of allocation 
to IIAs is positively but not significantly correlated with the acquirer's subsequent 
abnormal returns, suggesting minimal overpayment for IIAs and that the 
purchase of IIAs may contribute to positive excess returns for the acquirer after 
their bid. Overall, the supplementary analysis supports the primary regression 
results. Nevertheless, a caveat to our findings is the small sample size. 
 
Our study can be viewed as a first step in exploring the research agenda 
proposed by Ritter and Wells (2006). It differs from previous studies on a number 
of important fronts. First, by studying completed takeovers only, we have 
conducted a cleaner test by focusing on companies that we knew in advance had 
a current-year choice to make regarding their allocation of their takeover 
purchase price. These companies have higher average goodwill and IIA balances 
than a broader sample of all companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX). Therefore, the balances will be more likely to be material and the 
allocation decision more likely to have been given detailed consideration. We 
have also avoided the cases for which 'sticky' accounting policies for goodwill 
and IIAs over time can impact the integrity of data drawn from more than one 
observation per takeover. Secondly, with only pre-bid accounting data to measure 
our independent variables,4 we have overcome the endogeneity problem because 
pre-acquisition accounting variables are less likely to be influenced by the 
accounting policy choices made for an acquisition as well as by the very decision 
to go ahead with the acquisition. Lastly, the much longer sampling interval of our 
study5 adds to the reliability of the inferences drawn, gives us insight into the 
pervasiveness of the observed phenomena over time, and allows us to investigate 
any temporal changes in managerial incentives underlying the allocation of an 
acquisition price. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a 
literature review; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and research 
hypotheses; Section 4 provides the research model and variable definitions; 
Section 5 presents and analyses the data; Section 6 discusses the results. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes the paper.   
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior research suggests that capital markets value goodwill as an asset (Barth & 
Clinch, 1998; Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Churyk, 2005; Clinch, 1995; Godfrey & 
Koh, 2001; Henning et al., 2000; Jennings et al., 1996; Whittred et al., 2000). 
However, according to Henning et al. (2000), only one component of purchased 
goodwill, the excess of the market value over the fair value, is recognised by the 
market on acquisition. The other (residual) component of purchased goodwill, the 
excess of the acquisition cost over the market value (typically approximately 
30% of the total goodwill), has a negative association with equity values, 
consistent with the imposition of a market penalty for overpayment (White et al., 
2003).  
 
Using the Australian data for the period from 1993 to 1997, Wyatt (2005) 
found that share returns are strongly positively associated with IIAs, but only 
marginally positively associated with purchased goodwill. The significance of the 
goodwill result, however, depended upon the model specifications. Bugeja and 
Gallery (2006) found that purchased goodwill is value-relevant. However, when 
purchased goodwill is divided into (a) the current and previous two years and (b) 
older than four or more years, the older goodwill is found not to be value-
relevant. These authors suggested two explanations: (a) the older purchased 
goodwill is converted over time into ordinary net profit from the operations of the 
firm, and/or (b) there was overpayment in the original takeover and it takes the 
market several years to verify this. They were unable to distinguish empirically 
between these two explanations but suggested that the second explanation needs 
to be taken seriously. The results from our supplementary analysis are consistent 
with the overpayment theory.     
 
Clinch (1995) summarised the U.S. and U.K. evidence, up until 1995, for 
the value-relevance of reported goodwill as follows: (a) there is no consistent 
evidence of a stronger or weaker association between equity values and goodwill 
than between equity values and non-current tangible assets; (b) the association 
between goodwill and equity values only seems to exist outside of manufacturing 
industries; (c) the association between equity values and goodwill is not as strong 
as that between equity values and IIAs; (d) there is no consistent evidence of any 
association between share returns and goodwill amortisation. 
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Churyk (2005) found no significant difference between the strength of 
the associations of "purchased goodwill with the market value of equity" or 
"book equity less purchased goodwill with the market value of equity". The 
author argues that this finding is consistent with the value-relevance of purchased 
goodwill (Clinch, 1995) and the move by the FASB in 1999–2001 towards 
purchase accounting and away from pooling accounting. However, in subsequent 
years, when book net assets minus the market value of equity are negative 
(defined as an 'impairment condition'), the association between the interaction of 
purchased goodwill less amortisation with the impairment condition and the 
market value of equity is significantly negative. The coefficient is –2.02 for the 
first year after an acquisition and –4.54 for the second year. This suggests that the 
absolute value of share returns is positively associated with the absolute value of 
(previously recorded) purchased goodwill, thus supporting the overpayment 
hypothesis put forward by Bugeja and Gallery (2006). Acquirers, on average, 
cannot generate the rate of return on the purchased goodwill that they expected to 
earn at the acquisition date. The results from our supplementary analysis also 
offer some support for this conclusion.    
 
The U.S. and Australasian evidence suggests that managers use the rates 
of amortisation of goodwill and IIAs (Bradbury et al., 2003; Coombes et al., 
1997) and the goodwill write-off (Henning et al., 2004) to signal to the capital 
market the actual rate of decline in the economic value of intangibles (Bartov & 
Bodnar, 1996; Boone & Raman, 2001; Holthausen, 1990; Holthausen & 
Leftwich, 1983). However, despite such possible management intentions, the 
U.S. evidence indicates that there is no significant association between the 
goodwill amortisation charge and share returns (Clinch, 1995; Jennings et al., 
2001; Moehrle et al., 2001; White et al., 2003; Whittred et al., 2000). Jennings et 
al. (2001) have argued that goodwill amortisation 'adds noise' to the reporting 
system because the earnings before amortisation explain significantly more of the 
variation in share prices than the earnings after amortisation. White et al. (2003, 
p. 526) went so far as to say that goodwill amortisation is a 'non-event' that has 
no 'real consequences'.   
 
Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) documented that, from 1990 to 1997 for 
Australian firms with high underlying intangibles, the capitalisation of IIAs is 
significantly associated with (a) a higher following by analysts, (b) a lower 
absolute error in analysts' earnings forecasts, and (to a lesser extent) (c) a lower 
dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts. This suggests real and favourable 
economic consequences if flexibility is permitted in the area of accounting for 
IIAs. This flexibility existed in Australia prior to the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, but does not exist presently.   
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Ritter and Wells (2006) have shown that, on average, the book values of 
IIAs and purchased goodwill are imputed into Australian equity values (beyond 
the effects on the current period income) and that the book values of IIAs, but not 
purchased goodwill, are associated with future incomes. The first finding, which 
supports the value-relevance of IIAs, is consistent with the evidence presented by 
Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) that the accuracy of analysts' forecasts increases with 
IIA capitalisation. The value-relevance of IIAs beyond the current period income 
supports the results of Collins et al. (1999) who found that asset values are an 
important indicator of future performance, especially when current period income 
is very low relative to future permanent income. For firms already reporting high 
current period income, asset values can signal the permanence of this higher 
income.   
 
Ritter and Wells' (2006) second finding of an association between the 
book values of IIAs and future period income rules out the argument that the 
Australian share market mechanistically takes the book values of IIAs and 
impounds them into share prices. However, the finding that purchased goodwill 
is not associated with future income is consistent with an overpayment for 
goodwill (Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Churyk, 2005; Henning et al., 2000). It is also 
consistent with Wyatt's (2005) suggestion that the value-relevance of goodwill is 
highly sensitive to model specifications.  
 
James et al. (2008) examined whether the premium of a takeover bid was 
affected by the changes in the accounting standards for purchased goodwill in 
Australia. The issuance of AASB1013 in 1987 effectively took away the 
discretion afforded to management in their accounting choices for purchased 
goodwill. Based on information-signalling and opportunistic theories of 
accounting policy choices, they argue that constraining the accounting choices 
for dealing with purchased goodwill will reduce an acquirer’s firm value and thus 
the level of the bid premium paid. Their results show that the enactment of 
AASB1013 appears to have caused a statistically significant decline in the 
median (but not the mean) Australian bid premium. They also reported a 
significant decline in the strength of the association between purchased goodwill 
and bid premiums subsequent to the issuance of AASB1013. Unconstrained (i.e., 
unregulated) accounting policy choices for purchased goodwill seem to be 
regarded as a valuable option for managers, although this could be due to either 
opportunism or information-signalling. 
 
In summary, prior research from both Australia and overseas suggests 
that firms prefer to capitalise both IIAs and purchased goodwill if permitted 
under accounting standards. There are doubts as to whether purchased goodwill is 
value-relevant, as it does not appear to be associated with future income and, 
hence, may often reflect overpayment. The value of purchased goodwill minus 
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amortisation times the impairment condition (the book net assets below the 
market value of equity) is negatively associated with the acquirer's market value 
of equity even just one year after the acquisition date, and this negative 
association grows stronger thereafter (Churyk, 2005). Older goodwill that is four 
or more years out from the acquisition date is most probably not value-relevant 
(Bugeja & Walter, 1995). Capitalised IIAs, on the other hand, are unmistakably 
value-relevant and associated with future income; they also help analysts to 
provide more accurate estimates of a firm's value. This suggests that information 
signalling is likely to be a major factor in explaining firms' decisions to allocate a 
high percentage of purchase prices to IIAs, although opportunism can never be 
totally ruled out. 
 
By contrast, the capitalisation of purchased goodwill is unlikely to be 
consistent with information signalling for many firms because capitalised 
purchased goodwill does not seem to be associated with future income (Ritter & 
Wells, 2006). Such capitalisation in Australia during the sample period probably 
represents in most cases either opportunism or an altruistic/risk-averse approach 
to accounting policy choices in which firms choose to conform to the 'standard 
interpretation' of AASB10136 simply because it is the standard interpretation. 
Information-signalling theory would support a reclassification of purchased 
goodwill as IIAs in which the IIAs are assumed to be positively associated with 
the expected future income. However, in Australia during our sample period, 
opportunism theory supports the same action prima facie. We attempt to 
empirically distinguish between the opportunism and information-signalling 
theories in our work. 
 
The evidence suggests that firms avoid goodwill and IIA amortisation 
when possible, except for those classes of IIA that have a useful life limited by 
legal factors (on this latter point, see Coombes et al., 1997). Why managers 
appear eager to avoid goodwill amortisation remains somewhat of a mystery 
given that this amortisation does not appear to be significantly associated with 
share returns. As Whittred et al. (2000) have suggested, managers’ revealed 
behaviours in this area are probably due to contracting and/or information-
signalling reasons (remembering that goodwill amortisation also reduces the 
capitalised net goodwill value on the balance sheet, through the other half of the 
journal entry, and that the upwards revaluation of purchased goodwill has never 
been permitted). Mandatory amortisation for goodwill or IIAs over 20 years 
prevents firms from using a rate of amortisation that is lower than the acceptable 
minimum rate (5% per year), and hence, their information-signalling ability may 
be reduced.  
 
We introduce our theoretical framework in the next section, which 
includes our research hypotheses.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
We tested two competing theories that could explain differences in the proportion 
of purchase prices allocated to IIAs: the information-signalling7 and opportunism 
perspectives of positive accounting theory.  
 
Under the information-signalling perspective (Holthausen, 1990; 
Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983), managers select accounting policies to signal 
their expected future cash flows to a relatively less informed capital market. 
Under this view, the percentage allocated to IIAs is likely to be a positive 
function of the target's and the acquirer's investment opportunity sets (IOSs). If 
the target's and/or acquirer's IOS are large relative to the assets-in-place, other 
things being equal, the acquirer is more likely to prefer to classify the purchase 
price primarily as IIAs to avoid any compulsory goodwill amortisation (under 
AASB1013), which does not reflect any actual decline in economic value.    
 
Under the opportunistic perspective (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990), managers act opportunistically ex post 
facto to transfer wealth to themselves and away from shareholders (e.g., the 
bonus plan hypothesis) or to shareholders and away from debt holders (e.g., the 
debt-equity hypothesis). Because it is not possible or cost-effective ex ante to 
specify how wealth will be distributed among the contracting parties, the 
possibility of ex post facto opportunistic behaviour will always remain under all 
possible future states of nature. 
 
Opportunism and information signalling can be distinguished 
empirically. Under the opportunistic perspective, all acquirers, regardless of their 
IOS, but especially those with poor prior performance and/or high leverage, 
would prefer to allocate a large percentage of the purchase price to IIAs to avoid 
goodwill amortisation and thus to opportunistically manage profits upwards 
(Scott, 2003; Wines & Ferguson, 1993). However, under the information-
signalling perspective, only those acquirers acquiring targets with large IOSs for 
which the intangible asset values are material will prefer this allocation method 
(Anderson & Zimmer, 1992). To enable us to discriminate between information-
signalling and opportunism explanations, acquirers' prior performances, 
acquirers' pre-bid leverages, and acquirers' and targets' pre-bid IOSs were used in 
our regressions. This leads to the following four hypotheses (H1 and H2 are 
based on an opportunistic perspective while H3 and H4 are based on an 
information-signalling perspective): 
 
H1: The percentage of a takeover purchase price allocated to IIAs is 
negatively associated with the prior performance of the acquirer. 
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H2: The percentage of a takeover purchase price allocated to IIAs is 
positively associated with the pre-bid leverage of the acquirer. 
 
H3: The percentage of a takeover purchase price allocated to IIAs is 
positively associated with the pre-bid investment opportunity set of 
the acquirer. 
 
H4: The percentage of a takeover purchase price allocated to IIAs is 
positively associated with the pre-bid investment opportunity set of 
the target. 
 
Support for H1 and H2 would indicate that the opportunism argument holds, 
whereas support for H3 and H4 would favour the information-signalling 
explanation for the accounting choices for the allocation of takeover purchase 
prices. 
 
For H1, the argument is that firms with a poor prior performance can 
least afford the reduction in consolidated post-takeover profits that mandatory 
goodwill amortisation causes. Therefore, they prefer to allocate a large 
percentage of the purchase price to IIAs, primarily to avoid goodwill 
amortisation. This creates a negative association between allocations to IIAs and 
prior performances. In regards to H2, firms with high leverage and other things 
being equal, will be closer to a technical breach of the accounting-based terms 
contained in their debt contracts. Ramanna (2008) notes that prior evidence from 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) suggests that, while leverage is not necessarily a good 
proxy for the probability of a debt covenant breach, it is a good proxy for the 
costs of a debt covenant breach. Hence, leverage is the proxy for contracting 
costs used in the Ramanna (2008) study as well as in the present study. Ratios 
such as those of interest coverage and debt-to-income are made directly worse by 
goodwill amortisation, and highly leveraged firms may prefer to allocate a larger 
percentage of their purchase prices to IIAs to increase their reported profits. 
Other ratios usually used in debt contracts such as the debt-to-equity ratio also 
become less favourable with goodwill amortisation because the reduced profits 
reduce the end-of-period book shareholders’ equity and hence increase the debt-
to-equity and debt-to-assets ratios. Although intangible assets are usually not 
included in the asset base to compute leverage, goodwill amortisation is not 
typically added back into the reported profits for the purpose of assessing 
compliance with accounting-based debt contract terms (Whittred et al., 2000). 
Therefore, based on the opportunism perspective, a positive association is 
expected between the percentage of allocation to IIAs and the pre-bid leverage. 
The motivation in classifying a large percentage of the purchase price as IIAs is 
simply to avoid goodwill amortisation. Information-signalling is not involved 
under the opportunism perspective (or H2 based upon that perspective). 
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The opportunism arguments are supported by the findings of Daley 
(1985), who found that firms reacting negatively to the mandatory amortisation 
requirement of the non-binding professional standard AAS18: Accounting for 
Goodwill in 1984 (the provisions of this standard were essentially assimilated 
into AASB1013) had lower interest coverage ratios than those that did not react 
negatively. Pavletich (1989) reports that firms are more likely post-AASB1013 to 
obtain valuations of trademarks, patents and other IIAs that are outside the scope 
of the goodwill standard. Furthermore, there are more instances under 
AASB1013 (compared to AAS18) of firms revaluing their non-depreciable assets 
arising out of acquisitions such as land and investments, presumably to minimise 
the corresponding amounts allocated to purchased goodwill. Both of Pavletich's 
(1989) findings are prima facie consistent with both opportunism and 
information-signalling explanations and thus do not help us to distinguish 
between the two. 
 
Anderson and Zimmer (1992) found that firms with high 'economic 
goodwill' post-AASB1013 were more likely than firms with lower 'economic 
goodwill' to use the transitional provision of AASB1013 to write goodwill off as 
an extraordinary item. However, in the pre-AASB1013 period, high economic 
goodwill firms were more likely to retain goodwill as a non-current asset on the 
balance sheet. Thus, information-signalling considerations tended to predominate 
for these firms pre-AASB1013, but opportunism considerations predominated in 
the post-standard period (James, 2005, 2010). Clearly, the intentions of the 
standard-setters appear to have been thwarted in practice by a number of firms 
post-AASB1013 as the transitional provisions were designed to be a temporary 
ad hoc concession rather than a recommended treatment.  
 
Gore et al. (2000) found that debt contracting (i.e., opportunism) is a 
significant factor influencing U.K. firms' decisions to write goodwill off 
immediately in their financial statements. Grinyer et al. (1991) found that the 
percentage of the purchase price allocated to purchased goodwill8 for a sample of 
U.K. firms was significantly negatively related to their post-acquisition leverage, 
consistent with opportunism. Acquirers with high leverage prefer not to classify a 
high percentage of the purchase price as purchased goodwill because this was 
immediately written off against reserves and hence reduced book equity under 
U.K. accounting standard SSAP No. 22 (1984, rev. 1989).9  
 
Coombes et al. (1997) presented results consistent with information 
signalling, but not with opportunism. They found an inverse relationship in 
Australia between growth opportunities and the amortisation rate for IIAs, 
consistent with the information-signalling perspective. Furthermore, those IIAs 
with legally limited lives, such as patents, were more likely to be amortised than 
those without a legally limited life, such as trademarks, a finding that also 
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supports this perspective. A debt-contracting variable was not significantly 
associated with the rate of IIA amortisation.  
 
Wyatt (2005) reports, for the period from 1993–1997, that Australian 
firms' capitalisation decisions with respect to IIAs, given a firm's underlying 
intangible assets, are a positive function of their technology strength and the 
ability of the firm to appropriate investment benefits and a negative function of 
the length of the technology cycle time. These results support the findings of 
Coombes et al. (1997) and are consistent with information-signalling 
explanations. In contrast, leverage is significantly positively associated with IIA 
capitalisation in all sample years, consistent with opportunism. However, 
contracting and signalling variables could explain only a small percentage of the 
total variation in IIA capitalisation compared with variables capturing the 
underlying economics of the intangible assets. The coefficient of determination 
was 3% for the specification including only the signalling, operating, and 
contracting variables but rose to 13% for the specification that included all of the 
independent variables.10 
 
In Singapore, Tan (2001) studied the goodwill accounting policy choices 
permitted by the original version of IAS22: Business Combinations (1987).11 She 
reported a significant association between the level of human capital specificity 
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the goodwill accounting policy choice in 
the predicted direction. Tan (2001) argued that information-signalling is the 
primary determinant of the purchased goodwill accounting policy choice. The 
information being signalled is the incremental value derived from the human 
capital of the CEO or, more specifically, the firm's investment in that value.12 
Through additional robustness testing, she was also able to conclude that the 
result is unlikely to be due to opportunism. 
 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
To test our hypotheses, we ran the following basic regression model: 
 
PERCENTi = a0  +  a1ROAi  +  a2DEBTi + a3IOST,i  +  a4IOSA,i  +  ei (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage of the takeover purchase allocated to 
either IIAs (PERCENT1) or purchased goodwill (PERCENT2). The independent 
experimental variables are the following: ROA, the (pre-bid) rate of return on 
assets of the acquirer measured as the net profit after tax in financial year t-1 
divided by the average of total assets at the end of t - 2 and t - 1 (year 't' is defined 
as the first year in which the successful takeover is fully accounted for in the 
consolidated financial statements of the acquirer, which is not necessarily the 
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same year as that of the takeover announcement date); DEBT, the (pre-bid) total 
liabilities divided by the (pre-bid) total shareholders' equity of the acquirer at the 
end of year t - 1; and IOST and IOSA, the pre-bid investment opportunity sets of 
the target and acquirer companies, respectively, at the end of year t - 1 
(determined by factor analysis using the Kaiser-Guttman rule and the maximum 
likelihood estimation, see below); e is an independent and identically distributed 
error term.  
 
We also use PERCENT2 as an alternative dependent variable because the 
capitalised purchased goodwill, despite the mandatory amortisation requirement, 
may also be used for information-signalling. If, however, IIAs do not need to be 
amortised, acquirers with high IOSs may allocate more of their purchase price to 
IIAs and less to purchased goodwill (because the latter is the mathematical 
difference). The assumption here is that all or most of the reclassifications to IIAs 
are 'coming from' acquired assets that would have otherwise been classified as 
purchased goodwill rather than as target's net tangible assets. This argument is 
plausible and intuitive because it is easier to 'play around with' a simple 
mathematical difference such as purchased goodwill given that what actually is 
purchased goodwill theoretically has always been so obscure and strongly 
debated. It is more difficult, but not impossible (as Pavletich's (1989) results 
indicate), for an acquirer to reduce the net book values of the target's pre-bid 
tangible assets, such as cash, receivables, inventories, property and equipment, 
below the values that they were recorded at in the target's own accounts. 
 
With the pre-bid accounting data to measure our independent variables, 
we were also able to minimise the endogeneity problem because the pre-
acquisition accounting variables are less likely to be influenced by the acquisition 
accounting policy choices made as well as by the very decision to go ahead with 
the acquisition. 
 
Following Godfrey and Koh (2006), the investment opportunity set (IOS) 
for both the acquirer and the target was computed by factor analysis using the 
Kaiser-Guttman rule and maximum likelihood estimation. The factors included in 
the analysis are (a) the market-to-book value of assets at the end of year t – 1, 
where the market value of assets is the sum of the market value of equity and 
total liabilities; (b) the market-to-book value of equity at the end of year t – 1; (c) 
the price-to-earnings ratio at the end of year t – 1, with the earnings per share 
computed as the net profit after tax for year t – 1 divided by the average number 
of ordinary shares outstanding at the end of years t –1 and t – 2. High values of 
these variables are indicative of a high IOS.13 
 
We define the 'standard treatment' under AASB1013 as the reporting of 
the difference of the full purchase price minus the fair value of the target's net 
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tangible assets as the purchased goodwill on the consolidated balance sheet and 
then the amortisation of this complete amount on the income statement over 20 
years.14  
 
We control for auditor quality because high quality audit firms can 
advise clients on how to best structure their accounting policy choices to produce 
outcomes that are both favourable financially to the firm and can be defended on 
theoretical grounds should they later be challenged (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979). 
Therefore, acquirers with high quality auditors that have access to the auditing 
firm's knowledge base and reputational capital are more likely to challenge the 
'standard interpretation' of AASB1013 and allocate more of the purchase price to 
IIAs. Auditor quality can be proxied by the traditional big 'N' vs. non-big 'N' 
dichotomy (BigN).  
 
Control variables are: the sizes of the acquirer (SIZEA) and the target 
(SIZET), both measured by the market value of common equity at t – 1; the 
number of successfully completed acquisitions of subsidiaries and businesses by 
the acquirer during t (NUMBER); the linear time trend (TREND); and, an 
industry dummy (FINANCE), which assumes the value of 1 if the acquiring firm 
(or its parent company) belongs to the finance industry and zero otherwise. We 
controlled for the firm size (SIZE) and the number of successfully completed 
acquisitions by the acquirer in financial year t (NUMBER) because the larger and 
highly acquisitive acquirers are more likely to have a larger knowledge base 
about alternative acquisition accounting policy choices and make use of non-
conventional interpretations of AASB1013. Additionally, firm size is a standard 
proxy for the exposure to political costs that may occur upon acquisition 
accounting policy choices (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1978, 1986, 1990). To compute the variable NUMBER, we included all of the 
subsidiaries first consolidated by the acquirer in year t regardless of whether they 
met this study's sample selection criteria or not. The TREND and FINANCE 
variables control for any linear time dependency and industry effects, 
respectively. We also controlled for firms with negative ROAs because these 
firms may have different incentives for their accounting policy choices. 
 
 
DATA 
 
A complete listing of Australian takeovers from 1 January 1990 to 30 June 2004 
was sourced from SDC Platinum, which provides details on takeover 
announcement dates, target and acquirer names, target delisting dates, acquisition 
offer price(s) that include formal price revisions, percentage of shares held by the 
acquirer prior to and after the takeover, and percentage of shares sought in the 
takeover. Takeover data prior to 1990 were sourced from the ASX annual 
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publication Takeovers in Australia. Financial data were obtained from the 
Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) Annual Reports Microfiche 
Series and Datanalysis. Data on considerations, fair values of the assets/liabilities 
acquired (including IIAs), and purchased goodwill were obtained from the 
footnotes to either the Statement of Cash Flows or the Controlled Entities of the 
acquirer.15 Share prices were obtained from the Australian Financial Review and 
Datastream. All figures expressed in Australian dollars were inflated to 2004 
values using the Australian consumer price index (CPI) provided on its official 
website by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).   
 
To be included in the sample, we require both the target and acquirer to 
be listed on the ASX and have complete financial and share price data available. 
Mining companies (acquirers and targets) were excluded from our sample, 
consistent with prior published and unpublished Australian studies (Bugeja & 
Walter, 1995; James, 2005, 2010; James et al., 2008). We included finance 
companies but excluded mining companies because the products and services 
offered by finance companies can be differentiated and, hence, there can be 
goodwill. By contrast, the products offered by mining companies cannot be 
differentiated and, hence, any purchased goodwill that arises mathematically 
upon takeover is either due to an overpayment and/or simply due to differing 
estimates of future sales, costs, and profits and/or payments for synergies in 
production and marketing.  
 
Our final sample consisted of 52 successful acquisitions over the period 
from 1988 to 2004 (inclusive) for which either (a) purchase consideration and net 
assets acquired class totals (including IIAs) information was available for each 
individual subsidiary acquired during the year or (b) 90% or more of the total 
consideration paid in acquisitions during the year was paid to acquire the 
subsidiary in question. In those cases where between 90% and 99.99% of 
purchase consideration paid during the year was used to purchase the subsidiary 
in question, all assets and liabilities acquired, including IIAs and purchased 
goodwill, were mathematically 'allocated' by the researchers to the takeover 
under consideration. The sample is small. This is partly due to the exclusion of 
mining companies and the requirement that both the acquirer and target be 
Australian and listed. However, the main reason is that although consideration, 
net assets acquired and goodwill are always disclosed on a per subsidiary basis, 
individual asset and liability class totals, including the IIAs of the target, are 
often not disclosed for each subsidiary purchased.   
 
The benefits of our restrictive sample selection criteria are that we can 
explain and evaluate accounting policy choices on a per-takeover basis rather 
than on the gross basis of all successful takeovers made by a given acquirer in a 
given financial year.16 Furthermore, by studying completed takeovers only, we 
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have performed a cleaner test by focusing on companies that we knew in advance 
had a current-year choice to make regarding the allocation of their takeover 
purchase price. These companies will have higher average goodwill and IIA 
balances than a broader sample of all companies listed on the ASX. Therefore, 
the balances are more likely to be material and the allocation decision more likely 
to have been given detailed consideration. We also avoided cases for which 
'sticky' accounting policies for goodwill and IIAs over time can impact the 
integrity of data drawn from more than one observation per takeover.   
 
The frequency distribution in Table 1 shows that most sample firms were 
associated with the food, beverages and tobacco sector (23.08%), followed by 
manufacturing (15.38%), miscellaneous (13.46%), and financials (11.54%). In 
panel B, a marginally higher frequency of acquisitions after the year 2000 is 
apparent. 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average 
(median) percentage of the takeover purchase prices allocated to IIAs 
(PERCENT1) under AASB1013 was 19.09% (2.24%). Although not shown in the 
table, the mean (median) for the 1988–2000 sub-period was much higher at 
21.70% (5.55%). The lower figure for the entire sample period is in line with the 
greater opposition to the capitalisation of IIAs voiced near the end of the period, 
for example, by the IASB's David Tweedie, relating to Australia's allegedly lax 
unregulated accounting environment for IIAs prior to the adoption of IFRS in 
2005. Clearly, corporate governance standards and requirements increased after 
2000; after this time, auditors were under greater pressure not to accept non-
standard interpretations of accounting standards. Our finding is consistent with 
the observation that, during the 'unregulated period' of 1988–2004 when no 
accounting standard covered IIAs, firms frequently allocated large dollar amounts 
to IIAs immediately at acquisition (Whittred et al., 2000; Wines & Ferguson, 
1993; Wyatt, 2005). These dollar values were, either partly or in total, amounts 
that the standard interpretation of AASB1013 would suggest should be allocated 
to purchased goodwill. The standard deviation of 29.73% for PERCENT1 
indicates considerable variation in the extent to which firms departed from the 
standard treatment of AASB1013.  
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Table 1 
Frequency distribution 
 
 Number Percentage 
Panel A: By industry sector   
Construction 1 1.92 
Retail 1 1.92 
Telecommunication  1 1.92 
Transport 1 1.92 
Technology 2 3.85 
Engineering 3 5.77 
Health 3 5.77 
Leisure 3 5.77 
Media 4 7.69 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 6 11.54 
Manufacturing 7 13.46 
Miscellaneous  8 15.38 
Financials 12 23.08 
   
Panel B: By year of acquisition   
1988 5 9.62 
1989 1 1.92 
1990 3 5.77 
1991 3 5.77 
1992 5 9.62 
1993 1 1.92 
1994 1 1.92 
1995 1 1.92 
1996 1 1.92 
1997 3 5.77 
1998 2 3.85 
1999 5 9.62 
2000 1 1.92 
2001 4 7.69 
2002 8 15.38 
2003 3 5.77 
2004 5 9.62 
Total 52 100.00 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
AUDITFEE ($'thousands) 13949.61 372.86 357790.70 18.36 62174.94 
BigN 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 
IOSA 0.08 –0.18 3.75 –0.94 0.94 
IOST 0.07 –0.27 3.43 –1.47 1.05 
DEBT 95.14 88.84 235.45 7.83 56.16 
SIZEA ($'millions) 1620.00 564.00 9380.00 0.97 2340.00 
SIZET ($'millions) 265.00 117.00 1610.00 5.73 394.00 
NUMBER 2.16 1.00 9.00 1.00 2.10 
PERCENT1 19.09 2.24 100.00 0.00 29.73 
PERCENT2 23.86 13.24 95.12 0.00 26.37 
ROA 7.32 6.07 22.68 –23.72 7.21 
 
ROA, the return on assets, is measured as net profit after tax in financial year t – 
1 as a percentage of average total assets at end of t – 2 and t – 1; BigN takes a 
value of 1 if the acquirer firm was audited by a BigN auditor and zero otherwise; 
IOSA and IOST are the investment opportunity set of the acquirer and target 
company respectively, obtained by factor analysis of market-to-book value of 
assets, market-to-book value of equity, and price-to-earnings ratios; DEBT is 
total liabilities as a percentage of total shareholders' equity as at the end of year         
t – 1; SIZEA and SIZET are the size of acquirer and target firm size respectively, 
measured as the market value of common equity at the end of the financial year 
immediately prior to the takeover announcement date; AUDITFEE is the year t 
annual audit fees paid to the auditor of the holding company and its associated 
firms; NUMBER is the number of successfully completed acquisitions of both 
subsidiary companies and businesses made by the acquirer group of companies in 
financial year t relative to the takeover announcement month; PERCENT1 is the 
percentage of takeover purchase consideration allocated to identifiable intangible 
assets (IIAs); and PERCENT2 is the percentage of takeover purchase 
consideration allocated to purchased goodwill. An even larger percentage of 
takeover purchase prices were allocated to purchased goodwill than to IIAs. 
 
The variable PERCENT2 has a mean (median) of 23.86% (13.24%), 
suggesting an even larger percentage of takeover purchases were considered as 
allocated to purchased goodwill than to IIAs. Unfortunately, Grinyer et al. (1991) 
did not report the mean or median figures for their dependent variable for the 
percentage allocated to purchased goodwill (the purchased goodwill divided by 
Allocation Takeover Purchase Price 
19 
the total acquisition price for all acquisitions made during the year) in their U.K. 
study; thus, we cannot compare our results with theirs. Our finding is not 
inconsistent with our observations made above because, although many firms did 
reclassify purchased goodwill as IIAs, a large number of firms still elected to 
follow, either in whole or in part, what we have termed the standard 
interpretation of AASB1013. Although not shown in the table, a larger proportion 
of firms allocated at least some of the takeover purchase price to purchased 
goodwill than to IIAs.17 
 
The mean (median) after-tax ROA for the acquiring firms in the sample 
in the financial year immediately preceding the recognition of the takeover was 
7.32% (6.07%), suggesting moderate to high average profitability. Acquiring 
firms have a mean (median) leverage (DEBT) of 95.14% (88.84%). Abdul 
Wahab et al. (2011, Table II, p. 404), for their study of 1,022 Malaysian firm-
years for 2001–2003, report a mean (median) before-tax ROA of 5.201% 
(5.274%) and a mean (median) debt-equity ratio of 83.8% (26.1%). The fact that 
our acquirers appear more profitable (even after-tax compared to the Malaysian 
firm-years' before-tax ROAs) may be due to our firms being acquiring firms only. 
Acquiring firms may be, on average, more profitable than non-acquiring firms. 
Our firms are also more highly leveraged than the Malaysian firms considered by 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2011), which may be due to acquirers being both more 
profitable and more ambitious than non-acquiring firms in our study, thus leading 
to higher debt levels. This result may also reflect cultural conservatism among 
Malaysian senior managers, which makes them less keen on taking on higher 
debt levels compared to Australian managers. The larger difference between the 
mean and median leverage in Malaysia compared to our Australian sample 
suggests a "bunching" of firm-years in the low-leverage region for Malaysia. 
Different accounting regimes in both countries could also explain some 
differences because the data are taken from pre-IFRS years. In our study, an 
acquiring firm has a mean (median) market value of equity of A$1.6 billion 
(A$564 million), roughly five times that of a target firm.    
 
For the acquiring firms in our study, the mean (median) score of the 
investment opportunity set (IOSA) obtained through factor analysis is 0.08                   
(–0.18), and for targets (IOST), it is 0.07 (–0.27). The higher mean (and median) 
scores for the acquiring firms suggest that these firms have a higher investment 
opportunity set than their target firms. This is expected because negative prior 
share returns (leading to a reduction in IOST) tend to increase the likelihood of a 
potential target firm being the subject of a successful takeover bid.   
 
The NUMBER variable has a mean (median) score of 2.16 (1.00), with a 
maximum of nine acquisitions and a minimum of one acquisition completed by 
the acquirer in the acquisition year. Clearly, some acquirers are much more 
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acquisitive than others, although this variable is influenced by acquisitions of less 
than 100% owned subsidiaries, which may have been previously effectively 
controlled (but not consolidated) by the group. The median outcome is still to 
make only one acquisition per financial year. Of the 52 firms in the final sample, 
28 (62%) involved acquirers that made only one acquisition during the financial 
year. As stated previously, successful takeovers were relatively rare and 
important events for most individual Australian acquirers during our sample 
period. The average (median) firm pays an audit fee of A$13.9 million (A$0.37 
million). A relatively high percentage (82%) of acquiring firms (median 1.00) 
were audited by one of the big 'N' auditors, although it is worth noting that this 
figure was much lower during the 1980s and the first two years of the 1990s 
compared to later in the sample period. For the Malaysian firm-years in Abdul 
Wahab et al. (2011, Table II, p. 404), big 'N' audits averaged 0.681 or 68.1% 
(median of 1.00). The Big 'N's dominance of the Australian audit market grew 
significantly during our sample period (for better or for worse). The big 'N' 
dominance in Malaysia was nearly certainly less significant than in Australia 
during 2001–2003.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The Pearson's correlations presented in Table 3 indicate that there is a high 
correlation (the correlation coefficient is 0.46 and significant) between the IOS of 
the target firm (IOST) and the percentage of takeover purchase that is allocated to 
IIAs (PERCENT1). This result is consistent with the information-signalling 
perspective of positive accounting theory (Holthausen, 1990; Holthausen & 
Leftwich, 1983) and is obviously inconsistent with opportunism. We found no 
significant correlation between PERCENT1 and IOSA, ROA or DEBT. 
Opportunism does not appear to be strongly evident according to the data. 
Unsurprisingly, the size of the acquirer (SIZEA) is highly positively correlated to 
both the size of the target firm (SIZET) and the number of acquisitions by the 
acquirer (NUMBER). As expected, the percentage of the takeover purchase that 
is allocated to IIAs is significantly negatively correlated with the percentage 
allocated to purchased goodwill. This is in line with allocation to IIAs 'coming 
from' what would have otherwise been classified as purchased goodwill rather 
than what would otherwise have been classified as target net tangible assets. 
 
This demonstrates that firms recording IIAs tended to reallocate some of 
what would have been purchased goodwill to IIAs rather than what would have 
been target net tangible assets. Our study is the first Australian study to formally 
document this correlation. Overall, the correlation matrix shows that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our data.  
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations 
 
  IOSA IOST DEBT Ln(AUDITFEE) Ln(SIZEA) Ln(SIZET) NUMBER PERCENT1 PERCENT2 
IOST 0.10         
DEBT 0.18 –0.13        
Ln(AUDITFEE) 0.20 0.13 0.31       
Ln(SIZEA) 0.22 –0.13 0.13 0.37      
Ln(SIZET) 0.06 –0.14 0.16 0.33 0.47     
NUMBER 0.01 –0.15 0.10 0.15 0.43 –0.06    
PERCENT1 0.01 0.46 –0.02 0.10 –0.08 –0.30 0.18   
PERCENT2 0.04 –0.25 0.36 0.22 0.32 0.22 –0.03 –0.35  
ROA 0.16 –0.09 –0.10 0.00 0.51 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.16 
 
ROA, the return on assets, is measured as net profit after tax in financial year         
t – 1 as a percentage of average total assets at end of t – 2 and t – 1; IOSA and 
IOST are the investment opportunity set of the acquirer and target company 
respectively, obtained by factor analysis of market-to-book value of assets, 
market-to-book value of equity, and price-to-earnings ratios; DEBT is total 
liabilities as a fraction of total shareholders' equity as at the end of year t – 1; 
SIZEA and SIZET are the size of acquirer and target firm size respectively, 
measured as the market value of common equity at the end of the financial year 
immediately prior to the takeover announcement date; AUDITFEE is annual 
audit fees paid to the auditor of the holding company and its associated firms; 
NUMBER is the number of successfully completed acquisitions of both 
subsidiary companies and businesses made by the acquirer group of companies in 
financial year t relative to the takeover announcement month; PERCENT1 is the 
percentage of takeover purchase consideration allocated to identifiable intangible 
assets (IIAs); and PERCENT2 is the percentage of takeover purchase 
consideration allocated to purchased goodwill. N = 52. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for acquisitions for which the percentage of 
the takeover purchase that is allocated to IIAs (PERCENT1) is the dependent 
variable. We estimated equation (1) using a Tobit regression because our 
dependent variable was truncated at zero. The Huber-White estimator was used to 
compute robust variance estimates and to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
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The dependent variable is the percentage of takeover purchase consideration 
allocated to identifiable intangible assets. ROA, the return on assets, is measured 
as net profit after tax in financial year t – 1 as a percentage of average total assets 
at end of t – 2 and t – 1; BigN takes a value of 1 if the acquirer firm was audited 
by a BigN auditor and zero otherwise; IOSA and IOST are the investment 
opportunity set of the acquirer and target company respectively, obtained by 
factor analysis of market-to-book value of assets, market-to-book value of equity, 
and price-to-earnings ratios; DEBT is total liabilities as a fraction of total 
shareholders' equity as at the end of year t – 1; SIZEA and SIZET are the size of 
acquirer and target firm size respectively, measured as the market value of 
common equity at the end of the financial year immediately prior to the takeover 
announcement date; AUDITFEE is annual audit fees paid to the auditor of the 
holding company and its associated firms; NUMBER is the number of 
successfully completed acquisitions of both subsidiary companies and businesses 
made by the acquirer group of companies in financial year t relative to the 
takeover announcement month; TREND is a linear time trend; and FINANCE 
takes on the value of 1 if the acquirer firm was in the financial industry. N = 52. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
 
The first four specifications include only some or all of the explanatory 
variables relating to the research hypotheses H1 to H4. Because H1 and H2 relate 
to opportunism whereas H3 and H4 relate to information-signalling, 
Specifications 1 and 2 include only opportunism variables, and Specification 3 
includes only information-signalling variables. All of the experimental variables 
are present in the remaining five specifications (4 to 8). Specifications 5 to 8 all 
include at least one control variable. The complete set of control variables could 
not be included in any single regression due to cross-correlations and concerns 
about degrees of freedom.     
 
The results show that an acquirer's pre-bid after-tax ROA is a significant 
determinant of their acquisition accounting policy choice. However, the direction 
of the relationship implies that acquirers with good prior performances are more 
likely to allocate a higher percentage of takeover purchase prices to IIAs. This 
result also holds when control variables are added into the structural equation. 
Although inconsistent with opportunism, the result is consistent with efficiency 
arguments because it suggests that more profitable firms both acquire and 
capitalise a higher percentage of IIAs than less profitable firms. This result makes 
intuitive sense in today's high-tech economy in which acquisitions of intangible 
assets in the long run contribute to an increased rate of return on capital. In other 
words, accessing intangible assets increases the probability of earning economic 
rents through competitive advantages (Wyatt, 2005). Also inconsistent with the 
opportunism perspective, the table shows that the pre-bid leverage (DEBT) is not 
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a significant determinant of the percentage of purchase that is allocated to IIAs 
(PERCENT1). 
 
The estimated coefficient for IOST was positive and significant at better 
than the 1% level for all specifications. This is consistent with the information-
signalling perspective and prior empirical research (Coombes et al., 1997; Tan, 
2001; Wong & Wong, 2001; Wyatt, 2005). That is, there is a higher percentage 
of allocation of the purchase price to IIAs for targets with higher IOST. Firms 
with higher growth opportunities are likely to have more patents and other IIAs. 
In economic terms, a one unit increase in the IOST increases the allocation of a 
takeover purchase to IIAs by approximately 18 percentage points (Specification 8 
of Table 4). However, the pre-bid IOS of the acquirer (IOSA) is not a significant 
determinant of the percentage of the purchase price that is allocated to IIAs 
(PERCENT1). Therefore, the IOSA of the acquirer is of limited relevance for the 
percentage allocation decision. Obviously, this occurs because the IOSA of the 
acquirer may not reflect the IOST of the target, especially when the acquirer and 
the target are in different industries or when the acquirer is a diversified 
conglomerate, and logically, it is the target IOST that should drive acquirers' 
accounting choices with respect to their acquisitions of a target. Our findings here 
support our decision to reduce the sample size by studying takeover accounting 
choices on a per takeover basis rather than on an acquirer-year basis (see our 
earlier comments on this point).  
 
The results for Specification 6 show that BigN has a positive and 
significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with our prediction that firms 
choose high quality auditors so that they can access the auditing firm's 
knowledge base concerning which accounting policy choices can be selected to 
produce favourable reporting outcomes.18 It is possible that this result may be due 
to correlated omitted variables. For example, smaller acquiring firms with non-
BigN auditors may not be as skilled at negotiating a price and thus overpay, with 
this overpayment being classified as purchased goodwill. By contrast, larger 
acquiring firms can afford to identify better quality targets and can more 
accurately compute unbiased prices. However, it should be noted that in 
Specification 8 in Table 4, we included both the acquiring firm size and the target 
size as independent variables and found that the BigN variable retained its 
significance. 
 
We note that there is a significant drop (of about five percentage points 
annually) in the percentage of the takeover purchase price that is allocated to IIAs 
over time. Although it is not possible to prove this point, it could be that this drop 
was influenced, at least in part, by the opposition voiced by the IASB's David 
Tweedie and others in the early 2000s with regard to Australia's allegedly lax 
unregulated accounting environment for IIAs. Australia's approach was viewed 
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by some financial commentators as reflecting a 'corporate cowboy' mentality 
(see, for example, Boreham, 1999). 
 
We reran the above tests using the percentage of the takeover purchase 
price allocated to purchased goodwill as the dependent variable (PERCENT2). 
The results are presented in Table 5. There is a significant negative association 
between the target IOS and the percentage of the takeover purchase price 
allocated to purchased goodwill (PERCENT2). No significant relationship 
between an acquirer's pre-bid ROA or IOSA and the percentage of the takeover 
purchase price allocated to purchased goodwill was found. 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage of takeover purchase 
consideration allocated to Purchased Goodwill. ROA, the return on assets, is 
measured as net profit after tax in financial year t – 1 as a percentage of average 
total assets at end of t – 2 and t – 1; BigN takes a value of 1 if the acquirer firm 
was audited by a BigN auditor and zero otherwise; IOSA and IOST are the 
investment opportunity set of the acquirer and target company respectively, 
obtained by factor analysis of market-to-book value of assets, market-to-book 
value of equity, and price-to-earnings ratios; DEBT is total liabilities as a fraction 
of total shareholders' equity as at the end of year t – 1; SIZEA and SIZET are the 
size of acquirer and target firm size respectively, measured as the market value of 
common equity at the end of the financial year immediately prior to the takeover 
announcement date; AUDITFEE is annual audit fees paid to the auditor of the 
holding company and its associated firms; NUMBER is the number of 
successfully completed acquisitions of both subsidiary companies and businesses 
made by the acquirer group of companies in financial year t relative to the 
takeover announcement month; TREND is a linear time trend; and FINANCE 
takes on the value of 1 if the acquirer firm was in the financial industry. N = 52. 
p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Previously, profitable firms have not seemed to acquire any more 
purchased goodwill than unprofitable firms, suggesting that purchased goodwill 
is unlikely to be an important source of competitive advantage in the modern 
economy in general (Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Churyk, 2005; Ritter & Wells, 
2006).  Where there is evidence of purchased goodwill, it is quite probable that 
there has been overpayment by the acquirer (Bugeja & Gallery, 2006; Churyk, 
2005; Ritter & Wells, 2006), although this is not the case for every individual 
acquirer or for every individual acquisition. The relationship between the quality 
of an auditor and the percentage of a takeover purchase price that is allocated to 
purchased goodwill is insignificant. We report a significant negative relationship 
for target size, consistent with smaller target firms being harder to value and 
overpayments being more likely, leading to more allocation to purchased 
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goodwill. The size of an acquirer is positively related to the percentage of the 
purchase price allocated to purchased goodwill. 
 
Table 5 
Tobit regressions for percentage of takeover acquisition allocated to purchased goodwill, 
1988–2004 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ROA –0.30 –0.09  0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.13 
 (0.79) (0.92)  (0.98) (0.98) (0.94) (0.96) (0.88) 
DEBT  7.23  17.16 17.10 16.70 16.57 18.60 
  (0.45)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
IOST   –11.62 –10.88 –10.91 –10.70 –11.10 –13.15 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IOSA   1.34 –1.67 –1.62 –1.97 –1.97 –2.55 
   (0.68) (0.59) (0.61) (0.53) (0.55) (0.35) 
NUMBER     –0.12 –0.28 -0.70 –3.51 
     (0.96) (0.91) (0.78) (0.26) 
Ln(AUDITFEE)       1.87  
       (0.47)  
BigN      17.40  12.76 
      (0.08)  (0.21) 
Ln(SIZET)        –5.98 
        (0.04) 
Ln(SIZEA)        6.86 
        (0.05) 
TREND 2.00 2.00 2.46 2.87 2.85 2.74 2.52 2.26 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
FINANCE –29.30 –23.87 –27.02 –9.73 –9.98 –2.46 –8.70 –8.46 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.48) (0.47) (0.84) (0.54) (0.50) 
ROA<0 –50.00 –40.75 –30.53 –25.08 –25.04 –26.63 –22.76 16.48 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.00) (0.44) (0.44) (0.38) (0.49) (0.67) 
Constant 5.25 –4.31 –4.51 –28.00 –27.45 –41.50 –34.24 –55.67 
 (0.69) (0.83) (0.68) (0.12) (0.15) (0.03) (0.17) (0.39) 
LogL –161.13 –160.90 –146.58 –145.05 –145.04 –144.17 –144.21 –142.49 
Akaike 7.42 7.46 7.14 7.16 7.21 7.21 7.39 7.23 
Left cens. 14 14 14 14 14 14  13 14 
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The coefficient for DEBT is significantly positive, with more leveraged 
firms allocating a larger proportion of their purchase prices to purchased 
goodwill. This finding is inconsistent with the opportunism argument and also 
with previous empirical findings for the U.K. (Gore et al., 2000; Grinyer et al., 
1991). Our result may be explained by acquirer's (pre-bid) debt being a proxy for 
the target's IOST, and hence, there is a correlated omitted variable. This is 
supported by the negative correlation between a target's IOST and an acquirer's 
(pre-bid) debt (r = –0.13), as shown in Table 3. Highly leveraged firms tend to 
acquire targets with a lower IOST and also tend to allocate more of a purchase 
price to purchased goodwill and less to IIAs. It must be remembered that IOS is a 
complex theoretical construct; thus, our measure of IOS is unlikely to capture it 
exactly for our sample firms given that we use only three IOS proxies for the 
computation of our IOS factors. 
 
Finally, we note that there was a significant linear increase (of about two 
to three percentage-points annually) in the percentage of takeover purchase prices 
that were allocated to purchased goodwill over time. This is in line, although we 
cannot prove cause-effect, with the official opposition to non-conventional 
acquisition accounting policy choices being voiced both within and outside of 
Australia (as reflected in, for example, David Tweedie's comments and earlier 
than that the 'tightening up' of AASB1013 in 1996 that mandated the straight-line 
method of goodwill amortisation). This result suggests that 'political costs' in the 
form of regulator and media disapproval can have a significant effect on 
accounting policy choices on a time-series basis (despite the fears of those same 
regulators and media outlets that firms are 'corporate cowboys' in their choices of 
accounting policies).   
 
Supplementary Analysis 
 
In a supplementary univariate regression analysis (results not tabulated), we 
found that the percentages of purchase prices allocated to purchased goodwill 
(PERCENT2) were significantly negatively correlated with the acquirers' 
subsequent three-year abnormal returns (r = –0.193, p = 0.02, Adj. R2 = 0.0456), 
suggesting an initial overpayment for purchased goodwill. The percentages of 
allocation to IIAs (PERCENT1) were positively but not significantly correlated 
with the acquirers' subsequent abnormal returns (r = 0.088, p = 0.354, Adj. R2 =  
–0.013), suggesting that there has been minimal overpayment for IIAs and that 
they may contribute to positive excess returns for the acquirer after the bid. 
Overall, the supplementary analysis supports the study's primary regression 
results as reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has investigated the determinants of the once-off accounting policy 
choices that a successful acquirer makes in the acquisition year to classify a 
takeover purchase price as target net tangible assets, IIAs and/or purchased 
goodwill. Until 2004 in Australia, the accounting policy choices for IIAs were 
totally unconstrained. 
 
We found that many companies classified a large percentage of the 
takeover purchase price as IIAs during our sample interval (1988–2004): the 
mean (median) percentage was 19.09% (2.24%), and the mean percentage for the 
1988–2000 subperiod was even higher at 21.70% (not reported in the tables). 
There was a significant linear decrease (of about five percentage-points annually) 
in the percentage of the takeover purchase price that was allocated to IIAs over 
time, suggesting that the 'political costs' in the form of regulator and media 
disapproval can have a significant effect on accounting policy choices on a 
temporal basis.  
 
The regression results show that the percentage of the purchase price 
allocated to IIAs does not appear to be determined by traditional opportunism 
contracting variables such as leverage. An acquirer's pre-bid return on assets is 
positively associated with the percentage allocated to IOS, consistent with 
efficiency but not opportunism. Strongly performing firms tend to both acquire 
and capitalise a high percentage of IIAs in acquisitions, presumably to maintain 
their strong performance in the future. Although the IOST of the target is 
significantly positively related to the percentage of the takeover purchase price 
allocated to IIAs, the IOSA of the acquirer is not. The supplementary analysis 
shows that the percentage of the takeover purchased goodwill is significantly 
negatively associated with the acquirer's subsequent three-year abnormal stock 
returns. This finding supports our primary regression results and suggests 
overpayment for purchased goodwill, consistent with the prior Australian 
findings of Bugeja and Gallery (2006) and Ritter and Wells (2006). Nevertheless, 
a caveat on this finding is our small sample size. 
 
Despite the IASB/FASBs' perceived current preferences for the 
impairment test rule for purchased goodwill and capitalisation plus amortisation 
for most IIAs (as reflected in SFAS Nos. 141 and 142 and IAS3 and IAS38), our 
research has continued relevance because the accounting policy preferences of 
regulators and the public go in cycles.19 From the late 19th century up until the 
mid-1960s, most leading accounting authorities have preferred the capitalisation 
and amortisation rule for purchased goodwill over all other alternatives (Bryer, 
1995). It is unlikely that those holding strong views in the pro-amortisation camp 
have changed their opinions as a result of the FASB/IASB official hegemony. 
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The issue of which accounting policies to use for purchased goodwill and IIAs 
may yet again be debated at high levels by the world's most important accounting 
regulators. Our research offers a deeper understanding of the factors that 
systematically influence managers' initial allocation decisions (to target net 
tangible assets, IIAs and/or purchased goodwill) on a per-takeover basis. A 
unique contribution of our study is our documentation of how allocation 
decisions have changed throughout our sample period in response to regulator 
and media pressures. The results presented here also offer some further empirical 
support for Wyatt's (2005) and Matolcsy and Wyatt's (2006) arguments that the 
current IAS38 limits managers' abilities to communicate insider information 
about future cash flows arising from IIAs to the capital market (especially where 
those IIAs are internally generated or have increased in value above costs). 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The use of the pooling of interests method was prohibited by AASB1015. There 
is presently no comparable standard to AASB1015 in Australia, but its key 
content has now been subsumed within AASB 3 (Business Combinations) and 
AASB 138 (Intangible Assets). 
2. In 2005, IAS38: Intangible Assets (named AASB 138 in Australia) first came 
into effect in this country. In IAS38, intangible assets are defined as "an 
identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance." Under IAS38, 
intangible assets have a mandatory amortisation requirement. For more details 
on IAS38 see Deegan (2005). 
3. See, for example, the views about Australia's then unregulated accounting 
environment for IIAs expressed by Deloitte's national technical partner, Bruce 
Porter, and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) chief 
accountant, Jan McCahey, both reported in Boreham (1999). 
4. This contrasts with, for example, Grinyer et al. (1991), who used post-
acquisition leverage in their tests. 
5. The sampling periods for prior Australian studies are much shorter in 
comparison. For example, the sampling period examined by Matolcsy and Wyatt 
(2006) was only eight years, 1990–1997. 
6. That is, capitalisation of the difference of all or most of the purchase price minus 
the fair value of the net tangible assets as the value of the purchased goodwill. 
7. Information-signalling can be viewed as a subset of efficient contracting (it is 
hard to imagine a set of efficient contracts in which information-signalling is 
ruled out or frowned upon) and, hence, as far as this study is concerned, these 
two perspectives are collapsed into one. Under the efficiency perspective of 
positive accounting theory, managers select ex ante and in consultation with 
other contracting parties the set of accounting policies that simultaneously 
minimise agency costs, including the residual losses, and therefore maximise 
firm values (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
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8. We used the same dependent variable as Grinyer et al. (1991), except that they 
classified the allocation into only purchased goodwill or other target net assets, 
whereas we introduced a third category: allocation to IIAs. We acknowledge our 
debt to Grinyer et al. (1991). 
9. However, Wong and Wong (2001) argued that this study suffers from a 
correlated-omitted-variables problem because IOS was not included as an 
explanatory variable in the test. Furthermore, pre-acquisition leverage should 
have been used instead of post-acquisition leverage to overcome the endogeneity 
problem. We have addressed the two concerns of Wong and Wong (2001) in this 
paper, which may be viewed as a follow-up study to Grinyer et al. (1991). 
10. Wyatt (2005) defined signalling very narrowly to refer only to the cases in 
which firms signal at the time of an IPO or new debt and equity issue.  However, 
in our view, every capitalisation of an IIA in an unregulated environment 
(because it reflects a choice) is a signal.   
11. Under the original version of IAS22, as applicable in Singapore in the year 
1996, purchased goodwill could either be capitalised and amortised or written 
off directly against reserves. 
12. Specific knowledge is unique to individual firms and managers and is gained by 
those managers through experience. Given that specialised assets are created 
from firm-specific circumstances over time, firm-specific knowledge potentially 
has the ability to explain recognition policies relating to those specialised assets 
(using an information-signalling framework). Overall, the evidence presented by 
Tan (2001) supports a positive association between the firm-specific knowledge 
of a CEO and the adoption of a recognition policy for goodwill. 
13. We found that all three measures of growth load positively on the IOS factor. 
Acquirer IOS variables use post-bid data for those cases in which the acquisition 
is not included in the acquirer's accounts in the financial year that includes the 
takeover announcement date. Although this is not desirable on theoretical 
grounds, it is unlikely to cause practical problems. Our data is pre-bid in these 
cases only in the sense that the acquirer has not yet recorded the acquisition in 
its own accounts. However, most importantly, this data is not post-bid data, as it 
does not include the financial effects (on the acquirer) of the acquisition.  
14. A typical example of the 'standard treatment' is Toll Holdings Limited's year 
2001 acquisition of Finemore Holdings. In this acquisition, Toll reported a 
payment of A$119,906,000 for the fair value of the net assets acquired of 
A$79,164,000 and the Goodwill on Acquisition of the difference of 
A$40,742,000 (A$119,906,000 minus A$79,164,000) in the footnotes to the 
Statement of Cash Flows in its 2001 accounts. It classified A$Nil of the purchase 
consideration as IIAs. In the Intangible Assets footnote, this Goodwill on 
Acquisition duly appeared as an equal dollar increase in the Gross (pre-
amortisation) Goodwill balance. Toll conformed to the AASB1013 regulations 
and the 'textbook' measurement rules for purchased goodwill. For example, 
purchased goodwill, according to Schroeder et al.'s (2005, p. 322) textbook, is 
"the excess of total fair value [paid] over the fair value of identifiable net assets 
[acquired]." 
15. We use the IIAs figures listed here, which are the sum of the IIAs recognised 
pre-bid by the target and those later recognised by the acquirer in the acquisition 
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process. The goodwill of the target prior to the acquisition was defined as a part 
of purchased goodwill, even when the acquirer presents them separately 
(because under AASB1013, all goodwill is required to be accounted for in the 
same manner).   
16. As takeovers are major and not overly frequent events for the majority of firms, 
it is likely that significant decision-making time and effort is expended with 
respect to each individual takeover including accounting choices. For a given 
acquirer's acquisition in a given year, where target industry and target size may 
vary significantly, accounting choices may well also be different. To expand the 
sample size by taking as one observation all the takeovers made by an acquirer 
in one financial year would 'smooth out' and distort accounting choices and their 
consequences which we presume are made on a per-takeover basis. Additionally, 
grouping takeovers by financial year so that there is one observation per 
acquirer-year would introduce another source of bias that is a consequence of the 
financial year end date being an arbitrary way to group takeovers. 
17. Forty-four percent of the sample firms allocated none of the takeover purchase 
price to IIAs, compared to the 29% of firms that allocated none of the takeover 
purchased price to purchased goodwill.     
18. Our finding also suggests that, at least for our sample firms, it is the smaller 
audit firms that provide higher quality audits if high quality is operationalised 
here to mean accepting the standard interpretation of AASB1013. However, 
small audit firms may not be driven by altruism but may simply be less 
experienced in advising firms as to how best to account for their acquisitions 
and/or they may be less willing to 'take the heat' should the corporate regulators 
later take action against them for their part in breaching the letter of a AASB 
approved accounting standard. 
19. Accounting for purchased goodwill still remains today, in our view, as Malcolm 
Miller has said, a 'time bomb waiting to explode' (Miller, 1995, cited in Whittred 
et al., 2000, p. 239). The historically high degree of dispute and disagreement 
regarding how best to account for purchased goodwill can be seen by: (a) the 
U.S. Accounting Principles Board (APB) in 1970 placing Business 
Combinations and Intangible Assets in separate accounting standards so that 
both standards had a higher chance of gaining majority support from board 
members (Schroeder et al., 2005); and (b) the FASB first releasing a 1999 
Exposure Draft on goodwill accounting which recommended mandatory 
amortisation over a maximum 20-year period only to subsequently reverse its 
position in the face of opposition from Wall Street (Ramanna, 2008; Schroeder 
et al., 2005).   
 
 
REFERENCES 
  
Abdul Wahab, E. A., Zain, M. M., &  James, K. (2011). Political connections, corporate 
governance and audit fees in Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 26(5),  
393–418. 
Anderson, D., &  Zimmer, I. (1992). Reactions to regulation of accounting for goodwill. 
Accounting and Finance, 32(2), 27–50. 
Kieran James et al. 
32 
Barth, M. E., & Clinch, G. (1998). Revalued financial, tangible, and intangible assets: 
Associations with share prices and non market-based estimates. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 36(Supplement), 199–233. 
Bartov, E., & Bodnar, G. M. (1996). Alternative accounting methods, information 
asymmetry and liquidity: Theory and evidence. The Accounting Review, 71(3), 
397–418. 
Boone, J. P., & Raman, K. K. (2001). Off-balance sheet R and D assets and market 
liquidity. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 20(2), 97–128. 
Boreham, T. (1999). Accountancy plan poses profit danger, The Australian, 2 June. 
Bradbury, M. E., Godfrey, J. M., & Koh, P. S. (2003). Investment opportunity set 
influence on goodwill amortisation. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 10(1), 57–79. 
Brown, P. (1995). A note on the inverse (reverse) sum-of-the-years digits method and 
other ways to amortise goodwill. Australian Accounting Review, 5(1), 17–21. 
Bryer, R. A. (1995). A political economy of SSAP22: Accounting for goodwill. British 
Accounting Review, 27(4), 283–310. 
Bugeja, M., & Walter, T. (1995). An empirical analysis of some determinants of the 
target shareholder premium in takeovers. Accounting and Finance, 35(2), 33–60. 
Bugeja, M., & Gallery, N. (2006). Is older goodwill value-relevant? Accounting and 
Finance, 46(4), 519–535. 
Churyk, N. T. (2005). Reporting goodwill: Are the new accounting standards consistent 
with market valuations? Journal of Business Research, 58(10), 1353–1361. 
Clinch, G. (1995). Capital markets research and the goodwill debate. Australian 
Accounting Review, 5(1), 22–30. 
Collins, D., Pincus, M., & Xie, H. (1999). Equity valuation and negative earnings: The 
role of book value of equity. The Accounting Review, 74(1), 29–61.   
Coombes, R., Otto, D., & Stokes, D. (1997). Economic determinants of the amortisation 
of identifiable intangible assets (Working paper). University of Technology 
Sydney, Australia. 
Daley, M. (1985). The reaction of firms to AAS18: Accounting for goodwill, Unpublished 
Honours Dissertation, University of Queensland, Australia. 
Deegan, C. M. (2005). Australian financial accounting (4th. Ed.). North Ryde, Australia: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Dichev, I., & Skinner, D. (2002). Large sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1091–1123. 
Godfrey, J. M., &  Koh, P. S. (2001). The relevance to firm valuation of capitalising 
intangible assets in total and by category. Australian Accounting Review, 11(2), 
39–48. 
Godfrey, J. M., & Koh, P. S. (2006). Goodwill impairment as a reflection of investment 
opportunities (Working paper). Monash University, Australia. 
Gore, J. P., Taylor, P. A., & Taib, F. (2000). Accounting for goodwill: An examination of 
factors influencing management preferences. Accounting and Business 
Research, 30(3), 213–226. 
Grinyer, J. R., Russell, A., & Walker, M. (1991). Managerial choices in the valuation of 
acquired goodwill in the U.K. Accounting and Business Research, 22(85),              
51–55. 
Allocation Takeover Purchase Price 
33 
Henning, S. L., Lewis, B. L., & Shaw, W. H. (2000). Valuation of components of 
purchased goodwill. Journal of Accounting Research, 38(2), 375–386. 
Henning, S. L., Shaw, W. H., & Stock, T. (2004). The amount and timing of goodwill 
write-offs and revaluations: Evidence from U.S. and U.K. firms. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 23(2), 99–121. 
Holthausen, R. W. (1990). Accounting method choice, opportunistic behaviour, efficient 
contracting and information perspectives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
12(1–3), 207–218. 
Holthausen, R. W., & Leftwich, R. W. (1983). The economic consequences of accounting 
choice: Implications of costly contracting and monitoring. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 5(1), 77–117. 
Holthausen, R. W., & Watts, R. L. (2001). The relevance of the value-relevance literature 
for financial accounting standard setting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
31(1–3), 3–75. 
James, K. (2005). Accounting for goodwill in Australian business combinations: Is there 
a value to choose? Unpublished PhD diss. Curtin University of Technology, 
Australia (available online). 
James, K. (2010). Accounting for goodwill in Australian business combinations: Is there 
a value to choose? Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM-Verlag. 
James, K., How, J., & Verhoeven, P. (2008). Did the goodwill accounting standard 
impose material economic consequences upon Australian acquirers? Accounting 
and Finance, 48(4), 625–648. 
Jennings, R., Robinson, J., Thompson II, R. B., & Duvall, L. (1996). The relation 
between accounting goodwill numbers and equity values. Journal of Business, 
Finance and Accounting, 23(4), 513–533. 
Jennings, R., LeClere, M., & Thompson II, R. B. (2001). Goodwill amortization and the 
usefulness of earnings. Financial Analysts Journal, 57(5), 20–28.  
Matolcsy, Z., & Wyatt, A. (2006). Capitalised intangibles and financial analysts. 
Accounting and Finance. 46(3), 457–479. 
Miller, M. C. (1995). Goodwill discontent: The meshing of Australian and international 
accounting policy. Australian Accounting Review, 5(1), 3–16. 
Moehrle, S. R., Reynolds-Moehrle, J. A., & Wallace, J. S. (2001). How informative are 
earnings numbers that exclude goodwill amortization? Accounting Horizons, 
15(3), 243–255. 
Pavletich, J. (1989). Determinants of a firm's reaction to the introduction of AAS18. 
Unpublished honours diss. University of Queensland, Australia. 
Ramanna, K. (2008). The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence 
from the political economy of goodwill accounting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 45(2–3), 253–281. 
Ritter, A., & Wells, P. (2006). Identifiable intangible asset disclosures, stock prices and 
future earnings. Accounting and Finance, 46(5), 843–883. 
Schroeder, R. G., Clark, M. W., & Cathey, J. M. (2005). Financial accounting theory and 
analysis: Text reading and cases (8th Ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Scott, W. R. (2003). Financial accounting theory (3rd Ed.). Toronto: Pearson Education. 
Tan, P. H. N. (2001). An investigation of goodwill accounting policy choice within a 
specific knowledge framework. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 8(1), 25–38. 
Kieran James et al. 
34 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination 
of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112–134. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1979). The demand and supply of accounting theories: 
The market for excuses. The Accounting Review, 54(2), 273–305. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: A ten-year 
perspective. The Accounting Review, 65(1), 131–156. 
White, G. I., Sondhi, A. C., &  Fried, D. (2003). The analysis and use of financial 
statements (3rd Intl. Ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Whittred, G., Zimmer, I., & Taylor, S. (2000). Financial accounting: Incentive effects 
and economic consequences (5th Ed.). Sydney, Australia: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Wines, G., Dagwell, R., & Windsor, C. (2007). Implications of the IFRS goodwill 
accounting treatment. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(9), 862–880. 
Wines, G., & Ferguson, C. (1993). An empirical investigation of accounting methods for 
goodwill and identifiable intangible assets: 1985–1989. Abacus, 29(1), 90–105. 
Wong, J., & Wong, N. (2001). The investment opportunity set and acquired goodwill. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(1), 173–196. 
Wyatt, A. (2005). Accounting recognition of intangible assets: Theory and evidence on 
economic determinants. The Accounting Review, 80(3), 967–1003. 
 
